The final transfer of power from the long rule of Viktor Orbán to a centre-right government led by Prime Minister Péter Magyar was completed on Tuesday, when President Tamás Sulyok signed the decree appointing sixteen ministers. Yet the ceremonial handover was marked by an unusually pointed snub: all but one of the newly appointed cabinet members refused to take part in the traditional group photograph with the head of state at the Sándor Palace. Only the minister of agriculture, Szabolcs Bóna, appeared for the protocol shot, a gesture that from Budapest is being read as a deliberate distancing from a presidency still closely associated with the Orbán-era constitutional order.

The speed of the transition itself underscores Magyar’s determination to dismantle the political architecture Orbán built over sixteen years. Parliamentary committee hearings were compressed into just two days, and the new prime minister, a lawyer who took office only last Saturday, has moved swiftly to install a cabinet drawn largely from his Tisza party. Viewed from Brussels, the most consequential appointment is that of Anita Orbán—a former Fidesz member who has since broken with the party—as foreign minister. A scholar of Russian foreign policy, she is vocally pro-European and has written critically of Moscow’s “new imperialism”, a stark contrast to her predecessor Péter Szijjártó, who routinely briefed his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov after closed EU meetings. The change signals that Budapest may no longer act as Moscow’s spoiler within the Union.

The domestic agenda is equally telling. Márta Görög, the designated justice minister, announced on Tuesday that the new government will review the restrictive legislation on LGBTQ+ content access introduced under Orbán—laws that the European Court of Justice ruled last April violate EU law. Analysts in London note that compliance would unlock billions of euros in frozen cohesion funds, a powerful incentive for a government facing a strained budget. Yet the speed of reform will be watched closely; Magyar inherits a judiciary packed with Orbán loyalists and a media landscape largely under Fidesz control. From Warsaw, where the Law and Justice party once allied with Orbán, the shift is being observed with unease, as it weakens the illiberal bloc within the European Council.

Looking ahead, the greatest test for Magyar’s administration will be whether it can sustain its reformist momentum while managing a fragile parliamentary majority and a deeply polarised electorate. The refusal of most ministers to pose with President Sulyok suggests a strategy of symbolic rupture, but substantive change—on anti-corruption safeguards, judicial independence, and media freedom—will require more than gestures. From Moscow, the appointment of a foreign minister who has called for a tougher line on Russian aggression is an unwelcome development, but the Kremlin will likely wait to see whether Hungary’s tilt towards Brussels translates into concrete policy shifts on sanctions and energy. For now, the optics of a government that cannot bear to stand next to its own president capture the awkward, expectant mood of a country turning a page it had long thought stuck shut.