Iran is preparing an elaborate state funeral for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, more than three months after he was killed in the opening salvos of the joint US-Israeli offensive on 28 February. State television has announced the formation of a special headquarters to plan the ceremony, though no date has been set, citing a delay caused by the ongoing war. Mohsen Mahmoudi, head of Tehran’s Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council, confirmed that “various bodies are currently planning and making the necessary arrangements” for the event. Khamenei, who led the Islamic Republic for over three decades, was succeeded by his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who was wounded in the same strikes and has made no public appearance since assuming office. The funeral, when it finally occurs, will serve as a crucial moment of public mourning and a test of the new leadership’s grip.

The delay in burying the former supreme leader reflects the dislocation caused by a war that has targeted Iran’s military and political infrastructure. In April, thousands of Iranians marked the traditional forty-day commemoration of Khamenei’s death, but the official funeral has remained in limbo. Viewed from Washington, the absence of a visible successor has raised questions about the regime’s stability. However, Tehran appears to be using the interlude to choreograph a ceremony that will project continuity and resilience. The state media’s emphasis on “bringing together conditions” before going public hints at a carefully managed unveiling of Mojtaba’s authority.

Beyond the funeral planning, a deeper restructuring of power is underway in Tehran that has largely escaped Western analysis, according to a recent assessment in the Daily Telegraph. That article, by Iran specialists Kasra Aarabi and Saeid Golkar, argues that an informal coalition of security and military figures—centred on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—has forged a more cohesive internal alliance since the conflict began. This grouping, they contend, is reshaping the balance of power at the expense of traditional clerical institutions. Analysts in London note that many external observers continue to view Iranian politics through an outdated lens, missing the consolidation that has effectively accelerated the IRGC’s long march through the state.

The juxtaposition of the grand funeral and the subterranean power shift is telling. The public ceremony will seek to legitimise Mojtaba’s claim, but his authority may increasingly depend on the very IRGC network that has entrenched itself behind the scenes. If the restructuring described by analysts is accurate, the supreme leader’s role could become more reliant on military patronage than on priestly charisma. As the war grinds on, the funeral will be a spectacle for domestic and international audiences, but the more consequential drama lies in the unannounced realignments within the regime’s inner sanctum. Regional capitals from Riyadh to Moscow will be watching not only the pageantry but the realignment it is designed to mask.