As Washington and Tehran negotiate an end to their conflict, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is poised to be the primary economic beneficiary of any sanctions relief, according to four senior Iranian sources cited by Reuters. The interim deal announced this week allows waivers on sanctioned oil exports, while a more comprehensive agreement could unlock a $300 billion reconstruction fund and lift broader restrictions. Yet the IRGC’s deep entanglement in the Iranian economy—spanning oil, construction, shipping, telecommunications, and ports—means that the very entity the US and its Western allies designate as a terrorist organization could be the greatest commercial victor, a dynamic that confronts negotiators with a stark paradox.

Built under decades of international pressure, the IRGC’s business network is now so extensive that it acts as a gatekeeper for foreign investment. Under Iranian law, international firms must partner with local entities, and the sheer number of IRGC-linked companies positions the force to dominate access to the most lucrative sectors. Jeremy Paner, a former US Treasury sanctions investigator, told Reuters that the IRGC “pulls all the strings behind the oil sector” and that even if oil exports are authorised, American companies face legal exposure because of the IRGC’s presence. The 2016 US Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act allows victims of attacks to sue firms alleged to have aided designated groups, a risk that could deter Western capital even after sanctions are formally rolled back.

Founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the IRGC flourished under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, expanding its political power as it projected Iranian influence across the Middle East and suppressed domestic dissent. Since the outbreak of war on 28 February, which killed Khamenei, the Guards have consolidated internal control, helping install his son Mojtaba as the new supreme leader. One senior source described the IRGC as the “real winner of the war,” arguing that having secured the Islamic system’s survival, it is best placed to capitalise on any sanctions lifting, given its decades-long experience in running sanctions-busting operations. The IRGC’s engineering arm, Khatam al-Anbia, oversees hundreds of affiliates involved in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, automotive, tourism, and logistics, forming an empire that does not publish financial data but is estimated to be worth billions of dollars.

Viewed from Washington, the IRGC’s economic dominance presents a persistent obstacle: leaving the organisation on the terrorism blacklist would complicate any attempt to fully re-integrate Iran into the global economy, yet removing it is politically untenable for Western capitals. Analysts in London note that even without a comprehensive agreement, the IRGC would still benefit from temporary oil export waivers and maintain its economic grip through its mastery of sanctions evasion. For now, neither the IRGC nor the White House has commented on the Reuters report, and the shape of a final deal remains uncertain. The interim understanding provides a testing ground for whether sanctions relief can be calibrated to avoid reinforcing the force that US policy explicitly aims to counter.