A year after Friedrich Merz ascended to the chancellery at the head of an unwieldy grand coalition, the mood in Berlin is not merely grim but freighted with an existential anxiety rarely seen in post-war German politics. The chancellor this week flatly ruled out a minority government or snap election, declaring that the CDU-SPD pact must and will succeed. Yet the numbers tell a different story. Approval ratings for both coalition parties have cratered, and Merz’s personal popularity has sunk below that of his predecessor, a remarkable nadir for a leader who entered office promising decisive renewal. Viewed from Berlin, the coalition is now held together less by shared ambition than by a common fear of what might replace it: the surging Alternative for Germany, which has capitalised on every misstep.

That fear was palpable in Merz’s own public performance. In a televised interview, he described the fuel tax rebate intended to ease pump prices as working only “so leidlich” — so-so — inadvertently conceding that one of his government’s signature relief measures has fallen short. More tellingly, he allowed himself a rare display of emotion only when defending party colleagues against criticism, while adopting a studied, maritime-flavoured patriotism when asked about his vision for Germany. This oscillation between pugnacity and remoteness has become a hallmark, and it is wearing thin. Analysts in London note that a chancellor who complains publicly that no predecessor faced such trials — as Merz did recently — risks sounding not stoic but brittle, undermining the very authority he needs to steady the ship.

Overseas, the record is no less mixed. The chancellor’s handling of the Iran crisis has drawn pointed criticism from diplomatic quarters in Washington, where his combative posture toward the Trump administration was judged ill-suited to a leader who must defend German interests. A more positive note came from Israel’s offer to supply kerosene to Germany amid the Strait of Hormuz crisis — a deal that underscores deepening bilateral energy ties but also Germany’s uncomfortable reliance on ad hoc fixes. Domestically, the coalition is wrestling with a loosening of the heating law that the Greens warn could imperil the 2045 climate target, while in Baden-Württemberg, the CDU and Greens haggle over ministerial posts in a regional government that mirrors the national tension between pragmatism and principle.

What prevents the coalition from collapsing outright, many observers in Rome and elsewhere argue, is the very fear that Merz himself invoked: the prospect of a political vacuum that only the far right would fill. Yet fear is a thin foundation for governance. As the second year begins, the chancellor must demonstrate that he can translate the grand coalition’s mathematical majority into effective policy — or accept that the slow boring of hard boards, as Max Weber put it, requires more than just a grim determination to survive.