Russia yesterday began its largest strategic nuclear exercise in years, a three-day mobilisation of tens of thousands of troops, missile launchers and submarines that coincides with President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The manoeuvres, which run from 19 to 21 May, involve more than 64,000 personnel, 7,800 pieces of equipment, and the test-firing of ballistic and cruise missiles across Russian test ranges. The defence ministry described the drill as a rehearsal for “the preparation and use of nuclear forces under the threat of aggression”, a phrase that, viewed from Washington, carries an unmistakable edge given the concurrent collapse of the last remaining nuclear arms treaty between Moscow and the West.

The scale of the exercise—including the full nuclear triad of strategic missile forces, Northern and Pacific Fleets, long-range aviation, and eight nuclear-armed submarines—exceeds the Kremlin’s annual autumn “Grom” manoeuvres. Analysts in London note that this is only the second time Russia has held such a drill outside its typical October window; the first was in February 2022, days before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The timing, with Mr Putin in China for talks with President Xi Jinping, is deliberate. Moscow is simultaneously demonstrating its nuclear readiness to the West and cementing its partnership with Beijing, which has refrained from condemning the exercise. Belarus, where Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons since 2023, is participating in joint training on the handling and deployment of atomic munitions, a move that deepens the military integration between the two states.

From European capitals, the exercises are seen as another step in a pattern of nuclear coercion that has intensified since the breakdown of the New START framework. The drills come as Ukraine has escalated its drone campaign against Russian energy infrastructure, a tactical shift that Moscow has used to justify its nuclear signalling. Yet the Kremlin’s own messaging remains carefully calibrated: it insists the exercise is routine and defensive, and that its nuclear doctrine only permits use in response to an existential threat. Western intelligence agencies, however, assess that the threshold for such use has been steadily lowered in internal Russian planning, a concern amplified by the personal role Mr Putin has taken in overseeing nuclear readiness.

Looking ahead, the consolidation of the Russia-Belarus nuclear axis and the absence of any arms-control dialogue leave the strategic landscape more volatile than at any point since the Cold War. The G7, meeting in parallel, has reaffirmed its commitment to keeping frozen Russian assets until Moscow pays reparations, but has offered no new diplomatic off-ramp. For now, the world watches a Russian leader test his nuclear sword while shaking hands in Beijing, a dual choreography that underscores the erosion of the post-1991 security order.