The International Atomic Energy Agency must be officially designated as the verification body for any nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran, its director general has insisted, amid mounting evidence that the long-time adversaries are edging towards a deal to end hostilities. Rafael Grossi, speaking on the sidelines of a seminar for global media in Vienna, stressed that monitoring and verification represent the agency’s central task and that its formal inclusion in a settlement would be “a very important formality that is necessary”. According to the South Korean news agency Yonhap, Grossi said the IAEA stood ready to act as soon as the parties reached an accord and requested its services—a step that would then require him to seek clearance from the agency’s board of governors.

The context for Grossi’s intervention is a flurry of diplomatic activity reported from the Middle East and Asia. Iranian media have disclosed details of a draft memorandum with the United States intended to halt the prolonged shadow war between the two nations. Reports from Tehran indicate that a Qatari delegation recently travelled to the Iranian capital, while other accounts point to Pakistan acting as intermediary. What appears to be taking shape is a two-phase framework: an initial memorandum focused on a 60-day ceasefire, brokered with the help of regional actors, during which negotiations would begin on Iran’s nuclear programme and the fate of its enriched uranium stockpiles. Iranian officials have been at pains to clarify that the initial accord does not enfold nuclear issues; those are consigned to the subsequent talks.

Viewed from Vienna, Grossi’s emphasis on formal authorisation is a clear signal that the agency will not accept a politically convenient but legally ambiguous oversight role. The IAEA’s board—composed of 35 member states, including Washington’s European allies and rivals—must approve any fresh verification mandate, a process that could expose diplomatic fissures. Grossi noted that the most important issue for the agency is verification itself, a technical function that would be rendered hollow without proper legal grounding. Analysts in London observe that his forceful public stance may be designed to preempt any attempt to sideline the nuclear watchdog in a broader political bargain, much as the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action eventually foundered on monitoring disputes.

The outlook is for painstaking choreography. From Tehran, separating the ceasefire from nuclear talks allows the regime to project that it has not conceded on its core programme under military pressure, while buying time for detailed negotiation. In Washington, the nuclear question remains inextricable from any durable settlement: the Biden administration would face fierce Congressional scrutiny if it were seen to be decoupling them. Ultimately, the IAEA’s involvement—and the robustness of the verification regime it is permitted to deploy—will determine whether any accord can endure, or whether it merely papers over enduring mistrust with a temporary respite.