Iraq exported a mere 10 million barrels of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz in April, a catastrophic fall from the 93 million barrels shipped monthly before the onset of hostilities with Iran on 28 February. The figures, disclosed by the newly appointed oil minister Basim Mohammed Khudair at a Baghdad press conference on 16 May, lay bare the scale of disruption caused by the de facto blockade of the chokepoint. Before the war, Iraq produced roughly 4 million barrels per day; it now manages just 1.4 million, with most southern fields idle and tanker traffic paralysed by insurance fears.

Viewed from Baghdad, the collapse has forced an urgent strategic pivot. In March, after months of negotiations between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government, the long-dormant Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline resumed operations, carrying about 200,000 barrels per day to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Khudair has set a target of doubling that volume to 500,000 barrels daily, a move that would partially offset the loss of Hormuz. Yet even that ambition remains modest against the pre-war baseline, and the pipeline’s capacity is constrained by infrastructure age and political friction between Erbil and Ankara.

To accelerate recovery, Iraq’s new administration is simultaneously courting international partners. Khudair confirmed that talks have been opened with OPEC, as well as with major American oil companies including Chevron, ExxonMobil and Halliburton, regarding investments in production and export infrastructure. The minister declared a goal of raising production capacity to 5 million barrels per day, a figure that analysts in London note would require not only security guarantees but also a relaxation of OPEC+ quotas, assuming the cartel’s discipline survives the current crisis. The United States, for its part, is likely to view Iraqi outreach as an opportunity to stabilise global markets and reduce dependence on Iranian-controlled routes.

Forward-looking analysis must temper ambition with reality. Insurance costs for tankers transiting the Gulf remain prohibitive, and the Hormuz blockade shows no sign of lifting while the broader Middle Eastern conflict persists. Iraq’s southern export capacity is hostage to geopolitics; the northern pipeline offers only a partial lifeline. The government’s engagement with OPEC and American firms signals a recognition that domestic production targets are unattainable without foreign capital and technological expertise. But until either the Strait is reopened or pipelines are vastly expanded, Iraq’s oil resurgence will remain a plan on paper, not a flow measured in barrels.